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Common Callings, Hearings and Government Without
Accountability: The Very Per Curiam Case of Leis v. Flynt
Charles H. Clarke*
I. Introduction
Hustler Magazine and its owner, Larry Flynt, have occasionally needed
the assistance of counsel in preparing a defense against criminal obscenity pros-
ecutions. Both were indicted in Hamilton County, Ohio, on February 8, 1977,
for alleged violations of the Ohio Code concerning the dissemination of harm-
ful material to minors. 1 They retained as counsel in the case two nonresident
attorneys from New York who were not members of the Ohio bar.
The attorneys specialized in criminal defense and obscenity law. One had
received an award as outstanding practitioner of the year by the New York
State Bar Association in 1975.2 The other was a graduate of the University of
Toledo (Ohio) Law School and had practiced as a legal intern in the municipal
prosecutor's office in Toledo while in law school.
3
A pro hac vice admission to the bar of a state allows a nonresident attorney
to be admitted to the bar for a particular case only. 4 Ohio allowed pro hac vice
admissions to its bar with leave from the judge presiding over the case. 5 Fur-
ther, Canon 3 of Ohio's Code of Professional Responsibility expressly
disclaimed unreasonable territorial limitations upon the right of legal represen-
tation, especially in pending cases.
6
The two attorneys retained by Flynt for defense against the February 8,
1977, indictment had represented clients in earlier criminal proceedings in
Hamilton County. In the earlier cases, the nonresident attorneys had local
counsel submit an appearance form indicating that they were counsel for the
defendants. 7 The form, itself, however, was neither a pro hac vice appearance
nor did it indicate that designated counsel were not members of the Ohio bar.
8
In any event, use of the form was customary for pro hac vice admissions. 9
Although the two attorneys used this form in the case concerning the
February 8, 1977, indictment, they were refused pro hac vice admission for the
case without being given any reasons or an opportunity for a hearing.10 After
being denied mandamus relief by the Ohio Supreme Court, the attorneys sued
in federal district court to enjoin the state criminal prosecution until they had
* Professor of Law, Detroit College of Law.
1 439 U.S. 438, 439 (1979).
2 Id. at 451 n.14.
3 Id.
4 Pro hac vice means for this turn or for this one particular occasion; BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1091 (5th
ed. 1979).
5 439 U.S. at 439 n.2.
6 Id. at 454 n.21.
7 Ido at 439-40 n.3.
8 Id. at 439.
9 Id. at 439 n.3; Flynt v. Leis, 434 F. Supp. 481, 483 (S.D. Ohio 1977).
10 439 U.S. at 440.
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been given a hearing upon their pro hac vice applications." The federal district
court granted relief. 12 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed,'
3
holding that due process of law required notice of the reasons for their rejected
applications and a hearing.
The Supreme Court summarily granted certiorari and reversed the court
of appeals in a five to four per curiam opinion.14 The Court deemed pro hac vice
admission in Ohio to be completely discretionary in the sense that admission
was not governed by disclosed standards.' 5 Under these circumstances, the
Court held that the interest of an attorney in being admitted pro hac vice is not
an interest protected by the due process clause.
The due process clause confers protection against state deprivations of life,
liberty and property.' 6 The clause, however, does not create the property in-
terests which it protects.' 7 Further, state law created no property entitlements
respecting pro hac vice admission in Leis v. Flynt,' because state law there was
deemed to make admission completely discretionary. The Court also held that
there was no federal right that permitted lawyers to appear in state courts
without meeting the state's bar admission requirements. 19 Presumably, this
meant that Ohio's disposition of the pro hac vice applications did not infringe
any fundamental or state-created liberty interest, such as the right to follow a
common calling.
The thrust of the Supreme Court ruling is that procedural due process is
not much of a safeguard against arbitrary denial of the pro hac vice application of
a nonresident attorney. Procedural due process leaves the state free to grant
some pro hac vice applications while denying others. Further, it also seems that
constitutional equal protection guarantees20 would ordinarily be inapplicable
to this kind of discrimination unless they somehow mandate protection which
procedural due process withholds.
As a result, the position of a nonresident pro hac vice attorney is comparable
to that of a nontenured state employee whose lack of entitlement to ajob results
in almost no protection from an arbitrary discharge. 2' A reason for rejecting
the attorney or state employee is unchallengeable if it is facially valid. 22 In fact,
the reason for rejection need not be disclosed.
23
Of course, relief is theoretically available to either the nonresident at-
torney or nontenured state employee if the state violates some fundamental
substantive right, such as freedom of speech, 24 or discriminates on narrow in-
II Id. at 440-41.
12 Id. at 441; Flynt v. Leis, 434 F. Supp. 481 (S.D. Ohio 1977).
13 Flynt v. Leis, 574 F.2d 874, 879 (6th Cir. 1978).
14 439 U.S. 438, 445 (1979). Justices Stevens, Brennan and Marshall dissented on the merits. Justice
White wanted to grant certiorari and set the case for oral argument.
15 Id. at 442-43, 444 n.5.
16 ". . . INlor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
17 439 U.S. at 441.
18 Id. at 441, 444 n.5.
19 Id. at 443.
20 See notes 108-10 infra.
21 Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
22 Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 343, 347 (1976).
23 439 U.S. at 446-47 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
24 Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597-98 (1972).
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vidious grounds like race or sex. 25 It is difficult, however, to prove cases of this
description.26
Thus, Flynt generally allows a state to exercise facially standardless,
discriminatory civil licensing or other regulatory power without accountability.
A state that is free to discriminate in this manner without giving reasons is free
to discriminate secretly against nonresident attorneys merely to protect its local
bar from out-of-state competition. This kind of discrimination is ordinarily for-
bidden by the commerce clause 27 and the interstate privileges and immunities
clause 28 in the Constitution.
Further, the equal protection clause 29 of the fourteenth amendment or-
dinarily requires at least a rational basis for the justification of substantial harm
resulting from a state's differential treatment. 30 It is impossible, however, to
determine whether a rational basis for this kind of treatment exists when no
hearing to make the determination is available.
Therefore, it seems that equal protection and procedural due process do
not presently forbid a state from inflicting substantial harm without account-
ability when it governs the private sector, provided there is no invidious
discrimination or no injury .to a fundamental substantive right or nonfun-
damental state-created entitlement. This formulation allows a state too much
power without accountability. There are, of course, precedents that arguably
permit the state to make some irrational uses of its contract and property
powers.3 1 These precedents should be rejected. Moreover, they should be
replaced with a construction of the due process and equal protection clauses
which compels the state to rationalize the use of its power. This construction
would require the state to declare rules or reasons and grant appropriate hear-
ings unless the state could justify governing without them whenever it inflicted
substantial harm.
Finally, Flynt is difficult to reconcile with the Supreme Court's recent sug-
gestions that the right to engage in a common calling is a fundamental right.
This part of Flynt will be discussed in the following section. Flynt and its
authorization of government without accountability in the private sector will be
discussed later.
II. Leis v. Flynt and the Common Calling
as a Fundamental Substantive Right
The fundamental substantive right to engage in a common calling was
25 Compare Schware v. Bd. of Bar Examiners, 352 U.S. 232, 239 (1957).
26 See text accompanying notes 147-50 infra.
27 "The Congress shall have the Power... To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among
the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8.
28 "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the
several States." U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 2.
29 "No State shall.., deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S.
CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
30 Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 374, 381-82 (1974); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
994-97 (1978 ed.).
31 Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Van Alstyne,
Cracks in "The New Property": Adjudicative Due Process in the Administrative State, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 445-52
(1977).
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once a star of the first magnitude in the now-forgotten constitutional firmament
of laissez-faire.3 2 The right was part of a large freedom of contract and protec-
tion of private property.3 3 The right was also part of a system of constitutional
government which authorized the Supreme Court to determine the permissible
ends and means of government.
The power to determine the permissible ends of government included, of
course, the power to decide what constituted an adequate basis for concluding
that a law actually furthered a permissible end. This power was necessary to
prevent a legislature from furthering an impermissible end by enacting a law
that only ostensibly promoted a permissible end.
Thus, in Lochner v. New York, 3 4 the legislature enacted an employee health
law which forbade bakers from working more than ten hours a day or sixty
hours a week. The legislature hoped to ameliorate illness and premature death
associated with overwork, especially under trying conditions.35 In striking
down the law, however, the Supreme Court decided that hard work and long
hours in the ordinary common callings did not create any appreciable health
risks.
36
This judicial power to oversee legislative judgments was deemed necessary
to confine the legislature to its appropriate sphere of action.3 7 Naturally, the
state could provide protection against health risks caused by employment. The
Lochner opinion mentioned examples of proper employee health laws.3 8 The
Lochner Court, however, thought that the hours law in question was not a
health law.
Hours laws in that period were actually suspect as an illegitimate attempt
to give employees more benefits from the owners and customers of the in-
dustrial system than they could get by contract. 39 This kind of interference with
private property and contract rights was unconstitutional. As the Court said in
Coppage v. Kansas,40 "since it is self-evident that, unless all things are held in
common, some persons must have more property than others, it is from the
nature of things impossible to uphold freedom of contract and the right of
private property without at the same time recognizing as legitimate those ine-
qualities of fortune that are the necessary result of the exercise of those
rights." 41 Clearly, redistribution of economic benefits or wealth allocated by
the free market was an impermissible end of government.
Fundamental substantive rights usually required the price of labor, 42 ser-
32 Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590, 594 (1917); compare Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905).
33 Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 567-68, 570-71 (1922) (Holmes, J., dissenting), overruled
by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1931); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74-76
(Holmes, J., dissenting); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); compare R. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR
JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 53, 294, 319 (1941).
34 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
35 Id. at 70-71.
36 Id. at 59, 64.
37 Id. at 64.
38 Id. at 61, 62.
39 Id. at 64.
40 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
41 Id. at 17.




vices43 and goods44 to be set by the free market rather than by the legislature.
Judicial protection of these fundamental rights required more than the power
to review the factual basis of the legislature's determination that a harm within
the reach of government existed. 45 Protection was also needed against
legislative means which excessively intruded upon a fundamental right in the
interest of correcting an existing harm within the legislature's admitted con-
stitutional power. The Supreme Court provided this protection.
The right to engage in a common calling was a recipient of this kind of
protection. The operation of an employment agency, for example, was a com-
mon calling.4 6 Further, the state was forbidden from setting the price which
employment agencies could charge for their services although the state merely
wanted to stop some agencies from committing extortion, fraud, imposition
and discrimination. 47 Naturally, the abolition of these evils was within the
state's power, but this meant simply that the state could impose punishment
when such evils occurred.4 8 Moreover, it was immaterial that an unregulated
price may have been the primary cause of these undesirable practices. 49 Price
control was ordinarily beyond the power of the state.
Similarly, the state had tried earlier without success in Adams v. Tanner0 to
end abuses frequently committed by employment agencies by forbidding these
agencies from accepting fees from persons seeking work while allowing them
from employers. 51 This was deemed a partial abolition of a common calling.
52
It was declared unconstitutional notwithstanding the conceded existence of
serious abuses.
The fundamental right to engage in a common calling also received other
protection customarily associated with freedom of contract. Smith v. Texas, 53 for
example, prohibited a state from restricting desirable jobs to certain groups of
employees when freedom of contract would have allowed other qualified
employees to obtain them from the employer. In Smith, the state tried to close
the job of railroad conductor to qualified experienced railroad employees, such
as engineers, unless they had previously performed as conductor or brakeman.
Further, it could be claimed that under the principles of Adkins v. Children's
Hospital, 54 the right to engage in a common calling made an employee free to
bargain for the highest possible wages for his labor. Further, under the Lochner
principles he was also free to work more than ten hours a day or sixty hours a
week if he decided that his circumstances or those of his family warranted it.
55
The creation of this kind of fundamental law did not occur without dis-
43 Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350 (1928).
44 Williams v. Standard Oil Co. of La., 278 U.S. 235 (1929).
45 198 U.S. at 59-61, 64.
46 Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590, 594 (1917).
47 Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350, 358 (1927).
48 Id. at 358.
49 Id. at 364-65, 374.
50 244 U.S. 590 (1917).
51 Id. at 593.
52 Id.
53 233 U.S. 630 (1914).
54 261 U.S. 525, 561 (1922), overruled by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
55 198 U.S. at 52-53, 59.
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sent. Chief Justice Taft, dissenting in Adkins, intimated that the court had in-
validated minimum wage laws because of its belief that they expressed a policy
which was economically unsound. 56 He suggested that the Court's majority in
Adkins believed that minimum wage laws would make the underpaid
employees' situation worse.
5 7
Justice Holmes, also dissenting in Adkins, agreed with this criticism. He
said that the only issue raised by a minimum wage law or similar economic and
social legislation was whether the law's anticipated benefits were worth the
price it would necessarily exact. 58 Justice Holmes thought that the resolution of
this question was committed by the Constitution to the popularly elected bran-
ches of government. 9 Similarly, Justice Holmes, dissenting earlier in Lochner,
had said that due process of law did not enact Spencer's Social Statics, pater-
nalism, laissez-faire or any particular economic theory.
60
Freedom of contract and all that it meant were nowhere to be found in the
Constitution. 61 Moreover, freedom of contract did seem to take the basic
economic issues arising in a democracy out of the democratic processes. Some
believed that this removal was its purpose and that this purpose was unaccept-
able.
62
Eventually, seats on the Supreme Court were occupied by justices who did
not accept freedom of contract as a fundamental substantive right. The result
was predictable. Freedom of contract yielded to the exigencies of the great
depression of the 1930's. Recognition of the state's power to legislate a
minimum price for goods came first.63 The power of the state to establish a
minimum wage for labor followed soon afterwards. 64 Ultimately, the right to
engage in a common calling and the rest of freedom of contract disappeared, at
least for a time.
6 5
The termination of these rights occurred in Ferguson v. Skrupa.66 In
Ferguson, Kansas was allowed to abolish the debt adjustment business. The
common calling case of Adams, which involved the partial destruction of the
employment agency business, and other freedom of contract cases were ex-
pressly repudiated. 67 The Court specially emphasized that the wisdom, need or
appropriateness of economic legislation was to be determined exclusively by
the legislature. 68 Mr. Justice Harlan concurred for a reason which the Court
held to be irrelevant. He thought a rational basis for the legislation existed.
69
56 261 U.S. at 562 (Taft, C.J., dissenting).
57 Id.
58 Id. at 571 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
59 Id. at 567, 571.
60 198 U.S. at 75-76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
61 261 U.S. at 568 (Holmes,J., dissenting), overruled by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379
(1937).
62 R. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 182, 185-87, 317-22 (1941); compare Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74-77 (1905); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729 (1963).
63 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537-39 (1934).
64 West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937), overruling Adkins v. Children's Hosp.,
261 U.S. 525 (1922).
65 Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 728-32 (1963).
66 Id.
67 372 U.S. at 728-32.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 733 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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Ferguson also condemned use of the "vague contours" of the due process
clause to create rights that were not conferred by specific constitutional provi-
sions. 70 Two years later, the Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut
7" sug-
gested that fundamental substantive rights would be limited to rights expressed
or implied by specific constitutional provisions. 7 2 Griswold held that forbidding
married couples the use of contraceptives violated the fundamental right of
marital privacy. A "penumbra" rationale accounted for the existence of this
fundamental right which is not expressly mentioned in the Constitution. Provi-
sions in the Bill of Rights and elsewhere in the Constitution project emana-
tions, shadows or penumbras. 7 3 One of these shadows is a right of marital
privacy. 74 Five justices accepted the penumbra rationale. 75 Five justices also in-
dicated a willingness to find unwritten fundamental substantive rights although
they were not penumbras, but these justices could not agree upon a common
rationale .
7 6
The penumbra rationale denies fundamental rights status to substantive
rights associated with freedom of contract because these rights are not ex-
pressed or implied by any specific provisions of the Constitution. In Board of
Regents v. Roth, 77 nevertheless, which was decided seven years after Griswold,
while the penumbra rationale was still intact, the Court quoted the following
language from Meyer v. Nebraska78 about fundamental rights, including freedom
to contract and to follow a common calling:
While this Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty
... guaranteed [by the Fourteenth Amendment] ... it denotes not merely
freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract,
to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful
knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God
according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy the
privileges long recognized ... as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness
of free men.
79
Properly understood in context, however, this language did not affirm that
freedom of contract, including the right to follow a common calling, was a fun-
damental, substantive right.
Instead, the Roth court ruled that a state-created right to contract for
employment is a liberty interest entitled to the procedural protection of the due
process clause. The Court in Roth held that a nontenured state teacher was en-
titled to a hearing to try to clear his name when the state inflicted a stigma upon
him which seriously curtailed his employment opportunities. 80 The Court then
mentioned that the right to work for the state8 l is a right created by state law. It
70 372 U.S. at 731.
71 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
72 Id. at 484.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 485-86.
75 Id. at 486.
76 Id. at 486, 499, 502.
77 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
78 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
79 Id. at 399.
80 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972).
81 Id. at 573.
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also referred to state-regulated professional employment, 82 citing Schware v.
Board of Bar Examiners, 8 3 a case where the right to practice law was regarded as a
"grant of permission by the state. ' ' 84 Thus, Roth dealt with employment op-
portunities created by state law85 rather than fundamental rights when it spoke
of employment opportunities which can be curtailed by a stigma imposed upon.
a discharged state employee.
Other precedents after Griswold, however, suggest that the fundamental
substantive right of freedom to contract and to follow a common calling may be
due for revival. The penumbra rationale, which is inconsistent with such fun-
damental substantive rights, was very weakly endorsed in Roe v. Wade, 86 which
concerned the fundamental right to an abortion. Later, Whalen v. Roe, 87 which
upheld a computer data storage program for dangerous prescription drugs, ex-
pressly rejected the penumbra rationale, but not the fundamental substantive
right of privacy.88 The disappearance of the penumbra rationale removed any
doctrinal impediment to restoration of the right to follow a common calling as a
fundamental substantive right.
Subsequently, a step toward restoration was taken in Exxon Corp. v. Gover-
nor of Maryland. 8 9 There the Court had little difficulty in upholding a state law
which foreclosed oil producers and refiners from the retail gasoline sales
business against a substantive due process challenge. Notably absent from the
opinion, however, was the language in Ferguson stating that the wisdom, need
and appropriateness of such legislation were not matters for the federal
judiciary to decide. Instead, the Court said that the law had "a reasonable rela-
tion to the State's legitimate purpose in controlling the gasoline retail market,
and we reject appellants' due process claim." 90
Another common calling case came to the Supreme Court in its next term
after Exxon. New Motor Vehicle Board v. Orrin W. Fox Co.9 1 upheld a statute which
prohibited an automobile manufacturer from adding dealers in the territory of
existing dealers without cause. The restriction became effective upon dealer
protest and notice by the board without any kind of preliminary hearing. It was
held, however, that the availability of a hearing afterwards to determine
whether there was cause to continue the restriction satisfied procedural due
process requirements.
The complaining automobile manufacturer said that the statute deprived
him of the liberty to pursue a lawful occupation without due process of law.
The manufacturer claimed a "due process protected interest right to franchise
at will-which asserted right survived the passage of the California Automobile
82 Id. at 574.
83 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
84 Id. at 239 n.5.
85 Compare Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 709-10 n.5 (1976).
86 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598 n.23 (1977); but see Paul v. Davis,
424 U.S. 693, 712-13 (1976).
87 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
88 Id. at 598 n.23.
89 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
90 437 U.S. at 125.
91 439 U.S. 96 (1978).
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Franchise Act.' 92 The Court answered that this right was subject to reasonable
regulation if it existed. 93 The due process clause, of course, requires reasonable
regulation only of rights which the clause protects. Justices Blackmun and
Powell, speaking for themselves in a concurring opinion, said that Meyer de-
fined "liberty" to include "the right to engage" in any of the "common oc-
cupations of life." ' 94 Seemingly forgotten in all of this is Ferguson which killed
the common calling as a fundamental right. It may be that some fundamental
rights are more enduring than old soldiers. They neither die nor fade away, but
appear, disappear and reappear as the needs of the times require.
Since the Supreme Court seems willing to consider whether the right to
follow a common calling is a fundamental substantive right, and probably to
decide that it has this status, Flynt would have been a suitable occasion for the
right's resurrection. Surprisingly, the majority decided Flynt without mention-
ing the issue, thereby neither affirming nor disaffirming fundamental substan-
tive right status for the common calling. Instead, in speaking of nonresident at-
torneys, the majority said, "[flurther, there is no right of federal origin that
permits such lawyers to appear in state courts without meeting that state's bar
admission requirements. '95
This statement itself seems irrelevant to any issue in the case. The
nonresident attorneys in Flynt did not claim that their out-of-state attorneys'
licenses overrode any requiremehits of the regulating state. In fact, they wanted
to know what its pro hac vice requirements were in order to establish compliance
with them, but were informed by the Supreme Court that they did not have the
right to know what these requirements were. In any event, none of the
precedents cited in support of the majority's statement involved the assertion
that the right to follow a common calling is a fundamental substantive right.
In Brown v. Supreme Court of Virginia, 96 for example, the state was allowed to
deny reciprocity admission to its bar without examination to attorneys who did
not intend to practice law there on a full-time basis. Further, Ginsburg v.
Kovrak97 permitted a state to forbid an attorney from conducting a so-called
federal law practice from an office there without being admitted to its bar. A
third case, Nofolk & Western Railway Co. v. Beatty, 98 allowed a state to restrict
the participation of pro hac vice attorneys to a consulting or advisory role in
Federal Employers Liability Act and Jones Act defense litigation.
92 Id. at 106.
93 Id. at 106-07.
94 439 U.S. at 113; cf. Andrus v. Allard, 100 S. Ct. 318, 328, n.25 (1979). Andrus held constitutional a
law which protects certain endangered birds by prohibiting sale of the birds and related bird parts, including
those lawfully acquired before the prohibition became effective. After rejecting a claim that the law was an
unconstitutional taking of property, the court in footnote 25 of the opinion also said:
Appellees also briefly argue that the regulation in this case interferes with their right to engage in
a lawful occupation. Even if we were inclined to exhume this variant of the theory of substantive
due process, it would not be applicable here. Appellees may still sell artifacts that do not consist in
part of protected bird products.
95 439 U.S. at 443. The Court's preceding sentence also said that an attorney's interest in appearingpro
hac vice does not have its source in federal law. It does not seem that this sentence affirms anything more than
the power of a state to abolish pro hac vice practice if it so desires. The Court expressly affirmed this power
later. 439 U.S. 438, 444 n.5. See text accompanying note 117 infra..
96 359 F. Supp. 549 (E.D. Va.), aff'd mem., 414 U.S. 1034 (1973).
97 392 Pa. 143, 139 A.2d 889, appeal dismissed, 358 U.S. 52 (1958) (dismissed for want of substantial
federal question).
98 400 F. Supp. 234 (S.D. Ill.), aff'd men., 423 U.S. 1009 (1975).
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In the third case, the lower court observed that there was no constitutional
basis which compelled the admission of nonresidents to the professions within a
state.99 This court also remarked that it could not create a limited "national
bar and impose it upon the states." 10 0 The court, nevertheless, neglected to
mention what constitutional right was asserted there in behalf of pro hac vice
practitioners. It did state, however, that primary reliance was placed upon
Spanos v. Skouras Theatres Corp.101 which held that the national citizenship
clause 0 2 protected pro hac vice practitioners in matters of federal law.1
0 3
Subsequently in Norfolk & Western the Supreme Court limited the holding
in Skouras. The former case, however, was decided in 1975, before the Supreme
Court suggested that the right to follow a common calling might be restored to
fundamental substantive right status. Moreover, neither Norfolk & Western nor
Flynt itself expressly disposed of any constitutional claim predicated upon fun-
damental substantive right status for the common calling.
Flynt, nevertheless, allows a state to reject a nonresident attorney's pro hac
vice application without giving a reason or any requirement which an attorney
might or might not be able to satisfy in a particular case. This power over pro
hac vice admissions is clearly inconsistent with fundamental substantive right
status for the common calling. A state, of course, could justifiably maintain
that the only workable, certain indicium of an attorney's competence is a pass-
ing score on the state's bar examination. 0 4 Further, generally requiring bar
admission by examination would not violate any fundamental substantive right
to engage in a common calling. 0 5
This power over bar admissions, however, cannot explain Fynt. The state
did not claim that passing its bar examination was the only reliable indicator of
attorney competence. Instead, the state allowed pro hac vice admissions, which
suggests the state believed that some nonresident attorneys were competent to
try a particular case in its courts. Consequently, Flynt allows a state to deny pro
hac vice admission to nonresident attorneys who could satisfy its pro hac vice ad-
mission requirements. A fundamental substantive right to engage in a common
calling could not be dispatched so arbitrarily.
Further, it would be difficult to explain Fbynt as a case in which only a
trivial intrusion was made upon a common calling. In any event, the majority
opinion recognized the importance of multi-state law practice. 10 6 Thus,
although the Supreme Court has recently shown some inclination to protect the
right to engage in a common calling by requiring minimum rationality for
restrictions of this right, the Court in Flynt permitted a serious restriction of this
right without even calling for disclosure of the reasons.
Fundamental substantive rights did not help the complaining lawyers in
Flynt. Similarly, they had no state-created rights or entitlements because state
99 Id. at 237.
100 Id.
101 364 F.2d 161 (2d Cir. 1966).
102 "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, S 1.
103 364 F.2d 161, 170 (2d Cir. 1966).
104 See text accompanying note 117 infra.
105 Brown v. Supreme Court of Va., 359 F. Supp. 549, 555 (E.D. Va.), aff'd mem., 414 U.S. 1034
(1973).
106 439 U.S. at 442.
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law conferred nothing upon the out-of-state attorneys. Consequently, they lost
the case.
III. Equal Protection
The clauses of the Constitution which forbid impermissible discrimination
were not invoked in Font. Perhaps they should have been relied upon. These
clauses protect interests which are not substantive rights or entitlements under
any law.10 7 Nobody, for example, would contend that blacks can be racially
barred from the state employment which is terminable at will. A nonresident
attorney submitting a pro hac vice application would have the same protection
although his interest in pro hac vice practice is not a right.
The equal protection clause 1 8 of the fourteenth amendment is the most
general, but not the only clause in the Constitution which provides protection
against impermissible state discrimination. This clause does protect all per-
sons, including nonresidents, from impermissible state discrimination. On the
other hand, the commerce clause 0 9 and the interstate privileges and im-
munities clause' 10 of the Constitution provide a limited measure of equal pro-
tection. These clauses give nonresidents special protection against hostile state
discrimination.
Flynt permits a state to grant some pro hac vice applications of nonresident
attorneys and to deny others entirely without explanation. This power to
engage in unexplained discrimination permits a state to exclude qualified
nonresident attorneys from cases which are coveted by the local bar. The com-
merce clause and the interstate privileges and immunities clause, however, for-
bid state discrimination whose only purpose is to protect a local economic in-
terest from out-of-state competition. 1 '
Numerous cases have held that in the private sector, the commerce clause
requires a state to share its economic resources and opportunities with citizens
of other states. A state, for example, cannot satisfy its energy needs by denying
citizens of other states an opportunity to purchase energy produced within its
territory." 2 Similarly, a state which legislates higher prices for its own products
in its own market cannot close its market to cheaper products from other
states.513
Moreover, the interstate privileges and immunities clause gives
nonresidents comparable protection against state discrimination. Toomer v.
107 So-called privileges as well as rights are protected by the equal protection clause. Schware v. Bd. of
Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 238-39 n.5 (1957).
108 "No State shall.., deny to any person within itsjurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, 9 1.
109 "The Congress shall have the power... to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONsT. art. I, 5 8.
110 "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the
several States." U.S. CONsT. art. IV, S 2.
111 Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941) (commerce clause); Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511
(1935) (commerce clause); Oklahoma v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911) (commerce clause);
Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948) (interstate privileges and immunities clause); compare Hicklin v.
Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978) (interstate privileges and immunities clause). -
112 Oklahoma v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911); but see Pennsylvania v. West Virginia,
262 U.S. 553 (1923).
113 Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
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Witsell, 114 for example, forbade a state from excluding nonresident fishermen
from its commercial fishery in the marginal sea. Therefore, it is certain that the
commerce clause and the interstate privileges and immunities clause preclude a
state from selectively discriminating against nonresident attorneys whom the
state would concede to be qualified merely to give the local bar preferential ac-
cess to the state's law business. 115
Since Flynt does not require a state to explain discrimination amongpro hac
vice applicants, the state is free to deny applications only for law business
desired by its bar. On the other hand, the state can grant applications for
business requiring a nonresident specialist and for controversial matters which
the local bar might prefer to leave to outsiders. 116 The only effective way to pre-
vent this kind of discrimination is to insist upon both a legitimate reason for
discrimination in pro hac vice practice and a hearing to determine whether there
is a basis in fact for applying this reason. Fynt, however, excuses the state from
this obligation.
It is true that a state might choose to abolish pro hac vice practice altogether
if it cannot regulate the practice in complete subservience to the economic in-
terests of its own bar. A state can abolish pro hac vice practice in the interest of
insuring high professional standards without violating any constitutional
safeguard. 117 Moreover, this power over pro hac vice practice premised upon
quality control would, in effect, permit a state to abolish the practice for solely
economic purposes. This possibility, however, should not influence the answer
to the question of whether a state should be allowed to avowedly regulate pro hac
vice practice for such purposes.
In the abstract, it might seem that some pro hac vice practice would be
preferable to none. On the other hand, there is a possibility that only a small
amount would exist under anticompetitive conditions conducive to the pros-
perity of a particular state bar association. Consequently, it is doubtful whether
the gain would be worth the erosion of constitutional doctrine which generally
forbids the states from engaging in economic protectionism.
Further, even if some pro hac vice practice were preferable to none, it seems
questionable whether this observation is, in fact, relevant to state regulation of
this practice. A state that is presently self-sufficient in legal services has no
strong economic incentive to permit pro hac vice practice. Most of a state's at-
torneys undoubtedly are local practitioners. Apart from interstate convenience,
their economic well-being would be increased to some extent if pro hac vice prac-
tice were abolished. Moreover, nothing now prevents its abolition in the in-
terest of enhanced professional standards.
It would seem, therefore, that pro hac vice practice might be allowed
presently because there is a genuine need for it. In other words, most states
may not be self-sufficient in legal services. Such states could not afford to
abolish pro hac vice practice if they could not regulate it to maximize the well-
114 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
115 But see Sanders v. Russell, 401 F.2d 241, 246 (5th Cir. 1969); McKenzie v. Burris, 255 Ark. 330,
344, 500 S.W.2d 357, 366 (1973); see Rubin, A Constitutional Analysis of State Bar Residency Requirements Under
the Interstate Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, 92 HARV. L. REv. 1461, 1472 n.62 (1979).
116 See Rubin, supra note 115, at 1475 n.84.
117 Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. at 444 n.5; Brown v. Supreme Court of Va., 359 F. Supp. at 555.
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being of their local bar associations. Under these circumstances, there would
be little chance that pro hac vice practice would be abolished if manipulating it
for local advantage were expressly declared unconstitutional.
Although Flynt did not expressly decide whether a state can discriminate
against nonresident pro hac vice attorneys when they would take desirable
business from the local bar, it discussed with approval a case which would ap-
pear to allow such a practice. Once again, however, constitutional provisions
against discrimination apparently were not invoked in that case. Thus, in Nor-
folk & Western, a federal district court held that nonresident pro hac vice defense
attorneys could be strictly confined to the role of mere advisers in Federal
Employers' Liability Act and Jones Act litigation. The Supreme Court sum-
marily affirmed the district court's judgment on appeal.
1 8
In this case, the lower court gave general approval to the state's pro hac vice
practice, including full participation by nonresident attorneys only on a case-
by-case determination." 9 Consequently, the lower court might have thought
that a state does not have to abolish pro hac vice practice altogether if it wants to
assure that the local bar gets its share of desirable business. The narrow rule of
the case, however, seemed to be merely that the national citizenship clause
does not preclude severe limitations upon pro hac vice counsel's role in a
lawsuit. 1
20
Further, it is true that Flynt did not expressly raise the issue of whether the
state can manipulate pro hac vice practice in the interest of protecting the pros-
perity of its own bar. Similarly, the equal protection clauses of the Constitution
were not invoked in the case. The procedure authorized by Flynt, however,
would permit a state to regulate pro hac vice practice to further the economic in-
terests of the local bar. Therefore, Flynt was seriously defective for appearing to
permit this kind of manipulation by default.
Flynt also has another defect. The case permits civil government without
accountability. This result exposes all persons to unjustifiable discrimination
from which there is no protection, a basic flaw far more serious than simple
disregard of special protection which nonresidents have against state
discrimination. For, a regime of civil government without rules or reasons
allows a state to discriminate or to treat some persons differently than others
with very little possibility that it can be called to account. Further, equal pro-
tection usually requires differential treatment to be explained. Consequently,
assertion of the power to discriminate without having to explain would seem-
ingly violate equal protection. This would appear to be true of a facially stan-
dardless largely unchallengeable licensing power over pro hac vice admissions or
any other civil regulatory power.
Unlike the due process clause, the guarantees of the equal protection
clause do not depend upon fundamental or state-created entitlements. 121 The
minimum protection provided by the equal protection clause is simply the re-
quirement that there must be a rational basis for state discrimination.122 This
118 423 U.S. 1009.
119 400 F. Supp. at 237.
120 See note 104 supra.
121 Schware v. Bd. of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 238-39 n.5 (1957).
122 See L. TRIBE, supra note 30, at 994-97.
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rational basis requirement provides two kinds of protection. The reason for
state discrimination must have some rational relationship to a valid govern-
mental objective; 2 3 further, there must be a basis in fact for placing the reci-
pient of differential treatment in the class which receives it. 
12
4
The equal protection clause requires state disclosure of the reason for
discrimination and a hearing to test its rational adequacy and factual ap-
plicability. A state, for example, cannot rationally deny the pro hac vice applica-
tions of nonresident attorneys who have red hair and green eyes because these
physical characteristics have no rational relationship to attorney competence
and fitness to try a particular case. Even if the hypothetical disqualifying rule
were rational, however, some kind of hearing would be required to make sure
that it was not applied to an applicant with brown hair and gray eyes.
Admittedly, an equal protection challenge to a facially standardless grant
of state regulatory power does not seem to be a common occurrence. Perhaps a
reason for this may be that facially standardless power is usually administered
pursuant to actual standards or reasons and some kind of hearing. Thus,
Crowley v. Christensen1 25 seemed to suggest that equal protection forbade use of
an uncontrolled discretionary licensing power arbitrarily to deny a person what
was customarily granted to other persons similarly situated. The case did per-
mit the use of a facially standardless power to license retail liquor
establishments. The mere grant or use of such a power, however, did not
violate equal protection. Further, a hearing was available to persons whose li-
quor applications were denied.
1 26
Similarly, the Court in Kotch v. Board of River Pilot Commissioners127 did not
automatically exempt a facially standardless 128 power to license river pilots
from the requirements of the equal protection clause. It is true that nepotism in
administering the power was permitted. 129 The Court, nevertheless, said that
general grants of administrative power are tested by the way they are actually
administered. 130 It was immaterial that river pilots who were state officers were
few in number.
13 1
Of course, facially standardless, largely unreviewable regulatory power
can occasionally be justified. Subjective criteria, for example, may frequently
be important in some positions of employment involving close personal rela-
tionships. 1 2 Similarly, the Supreme Court has observed that effective prison
security, safety and welfare permit prison administrators to make intuitive sub-
jective judgments in transferring a prisoner from a moderate to a harsh
facility.133 Further, prison administrators can make such a transfer without a
123 Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 374, 381-82 (1974).
124 Schwarev. Bd. of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957); Tussman &Tenbroek, The Equal Protec-
tion of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341, 344-45 (1949). Compare Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Relationship Between
Fundamental Values and Procedural Safeguards in Constitutional Right to Hearing Cases, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 301,
302-03 (1979).
125 137 U.S. 86 (1890).
126 Id. at 87-88, 94.
127 330 U.S. 552 (1947).
128 Id. at 554 n.3.
129 Id. at 563.
130 Id. at 557.
131 Sd. at 554 nn.2 & 3.
132 Davis v. Passman, 99 S.Ct. 2264, 2279 (1979) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
133 Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976).
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hearing when state law makes the transfer decision completely discretionary.1 34
The primary reason given for this power, however, is that a convicted prisoner
has no liberty interest for procedural due process to protect when state law does
not prescribe any conditions which preclude a transfer. 135 In other words, the
state's infliction of substantial or grievous harm alone does not invoke the pro-
tection of procedural due process.1 3 6 The Court's analysis of the nature of the
transfer decision would, nevertheless, arguably allow a transfer without a hear-
ing if substantial or grievous harm alone activated the protection of procedural
due process.
Moreover, the nature of a particular subject may make it intractable to the
rule of law as ordinarily conceived. Thus, the death penalty was once ad-
ministered with only the most general guidance,1 37 albeit with serious objec-
tions about the lack of specific standards. 138 These objections were, of course,
ultimately accepted.139 Until they were, however, the prevailing thought was
that it was impossible for any words to express or explain the factors which
should be considered in deciding whether to spare or take human life. 140 Under
such circumstances, the possibility of different treatment in the matter of life or
death for persons who were similarly situated was great. 141 Differential treat-
ment was tolerated for a long time because more specific criteria seemed
unlikely to bring more evenhanded results.
The matter of pro hac vice admissions is, however, amenable to declared
rules and standards. Subjective considerations and judgments are almost com-
pletely immaterial. Admission to try a particular case, after all, is not a rare
privilege reserved for the distinguished scholars and statesmen of the trial bar.
Further, the state has the greatest power conceivable to protect the public from
attorneys who are not members of its bar.
Moreover, there comes a time in any profession when experience makes a
practitioner qualified to do what he or she has successfully done on many prior
occasions. Each state can decide the amount and kind of experience required
for pro hac vice admission, and it can prescribe enough to assure as much com-
petence as can be provided by rule alone. Exceptions for some who could not
meet the declared standard could be allowed for good cause. 142 Character and
fitness can be established by affidavits or unsworn statements as in ordinary
bar admissions. Compliance with local rules of practice and procedure can be
obtained by requiring local counsel to associate with the pro hac vice attorney.t
43
Consequently, pro hac vice admissions seem susceptible to stated rules with ob-
jective criteria if the purpose of regulation is to assure the competence and
fitness of those specially admitted.
134 Id. at 228.
135 Id. at 226-27.
136 Id. at 224.
137 McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 185-90, 191-95, 207-08 (1971).
138 Id. at 257-65 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306, 309-10 (1972)
(Stewart, J., concurring).
139 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 158, 197 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976)
(mandatory death penalty for first-degree murder was invalidated).
140 McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. at 208.
141 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309-10 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).
142 Cf. Goldsmith v. Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117, 123 (1926) (case involved rules for admission
to practice before the tax court including a discretionary power to deny admission).
143 Martin v. Walton, 368 U.S. 25 (1961).
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Of course, adequate but fair standards for pro hac vice admissions
sometimes might result in repeated appearances by those who would be more
welcome as rare visitors. This should arouse the apprehension only of those
who do not care for interstate competition. Repeated appearances by a nonresi-
dent attorney may be the best proof of his competence.
Thus, it is easy enough to make a case for the proposition that a facially
standardless, largely unchallengeable licensing power violates equal protec-
tion. A state desiring to engage in discrimination which inflicts substantial
harm without disclosing the reasons for its action asks for more trust than it
deserves. Occasionally, there may be no reason for the discrimination which
renders it baseless and a violation of equal protection. Further, the reasons
may be inadequate or lack any basis in fact for their application in a particular
case.
Although it is easy enough to argue that a facially standardless, largely
unreviewable regulatory power violates equal protection, the Supreme Court is
not likely to agree with this formulation. In fact, the Court has already ap-
proved the use of this kind of power. The Court has held that procedural due
process does not usually prohibit a state from discharging its nontenured
employees without a disclosure of the reasons or any kind of hearing. 144 Flynt
extended this management power over state functions to civil governance of the
private sector.
Admittedly, the equal protection clause was not asserted either in the state
employee discharge cases or Flynt, but the Supreme Court is not likely to
uphold a procedure challenged for lack of due process that it must ultimately
reject in the interest of equal protection. Further, the issue is not one of mere
pleading or discovery. In other words, the discharged state employee or re-
jected pro hac vice attorney cannot, as a practical matter, improve his position
simply by alleging a general or specific equal protection violation and then in-
voking discovery to learn the reason for the unfavorable state action against
him. 145 Such an approach differs only in form from that in Flynt where the
plaintiff sued to learn the reason for the rejection of his pro hac vice application
and a hearing to test its validity.
146
As a result, there is ordinarily no relief from an unconstitutional use of a
facially standardless, largely unreviewable state licensing power. Exceptions
exist when a state cannot conceal or inadvertently admits action that is patently
unconstitutional, 147 such as discrimination on the ground of race, religion or
association. 4 This kind of discrimination, however, will usually remain
undetected unless it is extensive enough to constitute a pattern or practice. The
same is true of discrimination on other arbitrary or irrational grounds.
The state simply does not have to explain a use of its licensing power
unless the injured party can establish a prima facie case without the state's
cooperation. A state, for example, can tell a discharged, nontenured, state
144 Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
145 But see Comment, Entitlement, Enjoyment and Due Process of Law, 1974 DuKE L. J. 89, 100 n.52.
146 Flynt v. Leis, 574 F.2d 874, 879 (1978), rev'd per curiam, 439 U.S. 438 (1979).
147 See Van Alstyne, supra note 31, at 449; Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367
U.S. 886, 897-98 (1961).
148 Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. at 239.
[April 1980]528
COMMON CALLINGS
employee the reasons for his discharge with impunity provided they are facially
valid. 14 9 Similarly, a black who believes that he or she is the victim of a racial
use of the state's licensing power will remain helpless if all that can be proven
are the matters of race injury. The state simply does not have to give an ac-
count of what it has done. Of course, disclosure of the reason and an ap-
propriate hearing to test its rational adequacy and the factual basis for its ap-
plication would not be onerous. It seems that this procedure should ordinarily
be mandated by procedural due process of law as well as equal protection of the
laws.
IV. Procedural Due Process and Civil Government Without Accountability
15 0
The state employee discharge cases establish that procedural due process
does not prohibit facially standardless, unreviewable state civil power.151 These
cases suggest that such a use of state power does not necessarily destroy life,
liberty or property which are the only interests protected by the due process
clause.152 The discharge of a nontenured state employee, for example, without
a hearing or disclosure of the reasons may rarely invade a fundamental
substantive liberty interest, such as freedom of speech. 5 3 Similarly, the
discharge does not necessarily harm any of the employee's nonfundamental
liberty interests created by state law, such as other employment opportunities.
In other words, the discharge does not ordinarily stigmatize the employee in a
way that effectively precludes other employment. 5 4 Moreover, the discharge
does not deprive the employee of any property interests. Property interests pro-
tected by due process are not created by the due process clause itself but de-
pend upon statutory or common law, usually state law.155 A nontenured state
employee does not have a property interest in the state job because there is no
contractual or statutory entitlement to continued employment.1
56
The state's refusal to contract with an employee by offering him continued
employment, however, does bar him from activity that he would be free to pur-
sue if he had the state's permission. Consequently, it does seem that the mere
refusal of the state to make a contract does curtail the employee's liberty in a
practical sense. Mr. Justice Marshall, for example, dissenting in Board of
Regents, said that everyone has a right to contract with the state unless there is a
reason for the state's refusal to make a contract. 5 7 The Supreme Court held,
nevertheless, that the mere refusal by a state to make a contract does not curtail
a liberty interest.
Admittedly, the reasonableness or rationality of a contract's provisions is
something that is ordinarily left to the contracting parties. But this explanation
149 Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 343, 347 (1976).
150 Procedural due process is supposed to ensure government with accountability. Rabin, supra note 124,
at 303.
151 Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); compare Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976).
152 Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. at 569-70.
153 Compare id. at 575 n.14.
154 See id. at 573.
155 Id. at 577.
156 Id. at 578.
157 Id. at 588-89.
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seems inadequate in view of Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, t5 an
equal protection case. In Murgia, mandatory retirement of state policemen at
age 50, including those well able to do the job, was explained on rational basis
grounds. 5 9 Surprisingly, no one argued that the opportunity of the state to
make the best possible bargain for itself was enough justification for what it
wanted to do. The only apparent difference between Murgia and a case involv-
ing use of a nonreviewable, standardless contractual or licensing power is that
the reasons for the state's action in Murgia were known.
Further, excusing the state from observing rationality requirements when
it makes contracts hardly justifies civil governance of the private sector without
rules, reasons or hearings. This observation is ignored, nevertheless, in state
license revocation cases. Instead, in these cases, the Supreme Court usually
takes special pains1 60 to emphasize that recognition of the right to a procedural
due process hearing occurs only because the license is a state-created entitle-
ment revocable for cause rather than merely terminable at the will of the state.
Then, there is Flynt, itself. The case authorizes a state to exercise a licensing
power which is invulnerable to a mere rationality challenge.
A standardless, ordinaril unchallengeable state licensing power is ob-
viously exempt from the rationality requirements of substantive due process of
the law and equal protection of the laws. Fundamental substantive protection
for the right to engage in a common calling, for example, would require ra-
tionality of any substantive regulations of the right.1 6' Similarly, a rational
basis for differential treatment is the minimum demand of the equal protection
clause. 162 As Flynt shows, however, these rationality requirements are
overlooked when a state decides to exercise a standardless licensing power. Ex-
cusing standardless government from being rational does more than shelter the
validity of substantive policies from judicial review. It also immunizes
mistaken or biased administration of a policy from judicial scrutiny.
This indulgence of irrational government does not occur, however, when
a state uses its licensing power to create entitlements rather than standardless
regulation. A state-created entitlement appears to be simply a right which can-
not be curtailed except for cause. In short, it seems to be nothing more than a
declared substantive right whose validity and application is willingly submitted
by the state to judicial review. Consequently, a state is allowed to escape or
submit to the rationality requirements of substantive due process and equal
protection as it pleases.' 63 The reasons for giving the state this option are
neither revealed nor apparent.
The Supreme Court, of course, has explained that the Constitution usual-
ly does not create the substantive rights which are protected by the due process
158 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
159 Id. at 311-12, 315.
160 Barry v. Barchi, 99 S.Ct. 2642, 2649 n.11 (1979) (harness horse trainer's license); Mackey v. Mon-
trym, 99 S.Ct. 2612, 2617 n.7 (1979); cf. Board ofCurators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 82-85 (1978) (interest
of a final-year medical student in graduating may not be a liberty or property interest).
161 Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 125 (1978).
162 See L. TRIBE, supra note 30, at 994-97.
163 This matter is very clearly set forth injustice White's concurring and dissenting opinion in Arnett v.
Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 181, 184-85 (1974); compare Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 347 (1976).
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clause.1 64 Property rights are created exclusively by other sources of law. 165
The same is also true of most liberty rights.16 6 Obviously, the Supreme Court is
unwilling to give the due process and equal protection clauses a construction
which would create many substantive rights against the state without its con-
sent. On the other hand, requiring the state to reveal the reasons for its restric-
tions and to subject them to judicial review would in effect force the state to
pass laws creating multitudinous substantive rights against itself. Generally,
one would have the right, for example, to drive a car, use a firearm, practice
law or do anything else unless he were restricted for a disclosed reason. It might
seem strange that a fourteenth amendment which creates only a few fundamen-
tal substantive rights would in effect mandate a complete civil code.
This apparent inconsistency, however, cannot explain why the Supreme
Court tolerates standardless, largely unchallengeable government. The reason
is that the inconsistency is only apparent rather than real. The few fundamen-
tal substantive rights which have been recognized make a small number of in-
dividual decisions autonomous or free from state interference. This is true of
the abortion decision,167 for example. Merely requiring the state to disclose the
reasons for its restrictions and to submit them to judicial review, however,
would not ordinarily restrict a state's policy choices. Only an invasion of a fun-
damental substantive right or a violation of equal protection or similar con-
stitutional provision can do that. Consequently, requiring a state to disclose its
laws and to expose them and their application to judicial review cannot imper-
missibly shackle the state.
Whatever may be said in its behalf, unchallengeable government has
serious faults. It permits unconstitutional state decisions to be wrapped in a
protective mantle of inscrutability. Flynt, for example, would appear to allow a
state to protect its bar from competition by out-of-state attorneys whose com-
petence the state would willingly concede provided the state hides what it does.
The power to do this, however, should be forthrightly affirmed or disaffirmed
rather than concealed in a web of obscurity.
Disapproval of standardless, largely unreviewable state power would or-
dinarily compel the state to provide a reason and a hearing when its actions
cause harm. One reason often mentioned for not mandating a general constitu-
tional right to a hearing whenever the state causes harm is that some kind of
hearing might also be required before the harm occurs. In Board of Regents, for
example, the Court said that a nontenured state employee would ordinarily be
entitled to a hearing before being discharged 6 if due process generally gave
him a right to a hearing with respect to the discharge.
Admittedly, a general duty to hold a hearing before harm might seriously
curtail desirable state action or induce a state to forego it altogether. The prob-
lems presented by a hearing before harm are not intractable, however. One
response would be to establish rules respecting when such a hearing would be
necessary. This might require a course of constitutional litigation which would
164 Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710 n.5 (1976).
165 Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. at 441.
166 Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. at 710 n.5.
167 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
168 408 U.S. at 570 n.7.
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involve considerable weighing and balancing. 169 A better response might be
generally to mandate an abbreviated prior hearing which would consist of an
informal give-and-take confrontation instead of a mini-trial. 170 It might even
be desirable to limit prior trial-type hearings to cases of severe exigency, such
as welfare termination cases.
The Supreme Court may be moving in this direction. The Court, for ex-
ample, seems willing to relax its position about mandating prior hearings.
Although a tenured state employee was once apparently entitled to a hearing
before discharge,' 71 it now may be that a hearing afterwards will suffice. 17 2 In
any event, the drawbacks of a hearing before harm are not a real justification
for completely doing away with a hearing after harm.
Naturally, there are arguments for committing the right to a hearing after
harm by the state to the exclusive protection of the legislature. Hearings can be
expensive. Further, the right does concern most of the state's people in one way
or another. Neither of these matters, however, deserves serious consideration
in deciding whether the right to a hearing after harm by the state deserves con-
stitutional status.
This is true because fair administrative law systems can minimize the need
and expense for hearings. Conversely, the greater the demand for hearings, the
greater is the likelihood of unfairness and the need to correct it. 17 3 The plea that
the state is too poor to be fair should not be easily accepted.
Another reason is given for tolerating standardless, largely unreviewable,
state power. This argument suggests that the opposite position might permit all
challenged uses of a state's property, contract and licensing powers to end up
as arguable constitutional cases in federal court. This end cannot result,
however, as long as standardless government is permissible.
Ordinarily, the state's exercise of standardless civil power does not now
violate anyone's constitutional rights. As a corollary, a person who is subject to
the state's standardless civil powers acquires only those rights that the state
decides to confer. Naturally, procedural due process must be observed when
the state confers entitlements, but compliance with this requirement does not
seem particularly onerous, and it does allow the state to keep state property,
contract and licensing cases in its own courts. Compliance assures that there
will usually be no procedural due process violation of state-created substantive
rights which the state could have withheld.
The situation would be different, however, if due process or equal protec-
tion required the state to have a basis in fact for refusing use of its property, a
contract, a license or other permission for private conduct. Theoretically, at
least, an enormous expansion of federal court jurisdiction would be possible.
On the other hand, only a small increase in federal court cases could occur.
The matter would depend upon the scope of the state's obligation to have a
basis in fact for inflicting deliberate harm.
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169 See Comment, Entitlement, Enjoyment and Due Process of Law, 1974 DuKE L.J. 89, 119.
170 Davis, The Goss Principle, 16 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 289, 292-94 (1979).
171 See note 168 supra.
172 Boehning v. Indiana State Employees Ass'n., Inc., 423 U.S. 6, 7 n.3 (1975) (per euriam).
173 Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 591 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
174 Compare Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property, " 62 CORNELL L. REV. 405, 428-29 (1977).
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A person who was deliberately harmed by the state, for example, could in
theory sue in federal court on the ground that the factual premises for the
state's action were simply mistaken although the relevant evidence was
conflicting. Further, pendent jurisdiction could 75 permit the federal court to
hear any integral state law claims regardless of how generous a state's hearings
and entitlements law might be. It would be possible for all deliberate, harmful
state action to be challenged in federal court.
These consequences, of course, show only the extreme possibilities of
theoretical extravagance. On the other hand, the essential element of a state's
constitutional obligation to have a basis in fact for inflicting deliberate harm
could be realistic and limited. It could consist simply of the state's willingness
to give a reason for the harm and to permit its factual and rational adequacy to
be tested in an appropriate hearing.
This scope of the state's basis in fact obligation would not permit a federal
lawsuit for state-inflicted harm unless the state wanted to exercise power
without accountability. Consequently, a groundless complaint that the state in-
flicted harm without a reason and an opportunity for a hearing could be
dismissed upon the pleadings or after an appropriate jurisdictional hearing.
176
In any event, the gravamen of the injured party's complaint would be that the
state harmed him and was unwilling to provide a reason and any kind of hear-
ing. There would be no basis for federal judicial intervention if the state were
willing to provide a reason and a hearing. In rare situations, when a state can
act, arguably without having to give a reason or a hearing, the federal cour-,
could hear the case.
Of course, the idea of giving any court a say in the administration of state
property, the discharge of state employees or control over state licenses may
seem unwise and alien to some persons. Perhaps the nation's traditions give
the executive and legislative branches of government essentially a free hand in
these matters. It is possible, nevertheless, to apply the Constitution to these
matters in a way that leaves this free hand largely intact. The state could be
allowed to prevail if there were a basis in fact for what it did. A nontenured
state employee, for example, could be discharged if the state could make some
showing that the employee was undesirable and that his undesirability was the
reason for the discharge. The burden of persuasion could be cast upon the com-
plaining party. 177 His prospects of prevailing could be made difficult enough to
discourage frivolous lawsuits while leaving redress available for the party who
might deserve it. A constitutional right to a hearing after harm should not in
theory or in practice hobble the state.
The due process and equal protection clauses would support a construc-
tion which requires an appropriate hearing whenever the state commits a
substantial harm. Justice Frankfurter believed procedural due process required
a hearing whenever the state committed grievous harm. 78 Any difference be-
tween grievous and substantial harm would seem to be a matter of degree.
175 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 443-48 (1975).
176 Cf. id. at 444, 451-54 (if federal claim is too insubstantial to be the basis of federal question jurisdic-
tion, there will be no pendent jurisdiction of the state claim).
177 LaVine v. Milne, 424 U.S. 577, 585 n.10 (1976).
178 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissent-
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Life, liberty and property effectively comprise all interests of concern to
the people. 179 It seems unnatural to say, as the Court said in Roth, that expan-
sive as these words are, they must have some limits. 180 Admittedly, the idea
that a state can impair liberty merely by inflicting harm or by refusing to make
a contract, to permit a use of its property or even to grant property is not readi-
ly accepted. The difficulty arises from the conception of liberty as primarily
freedom from restrictions enforceable by the coercive power of the state.' 8'
This conception of liberty declares that a person is free to use his talents and
property and to persuade others willingly to contract with him. Obviously, this
kind of freedom is antagonistic to the idea that a person can insist that the state
or anyone else enter into a contract or other advantageous relationship with
him.
Consequently, liberty has rested upon a foundation of property, contract
and consent. However suitable this conception of liberty might be in a world of
laissez-faire, it hardly seems appropriate to an extensively regulated and ad-
ministered post-industrial state. A laissez-faire conception of liberty posits that
a person is on his own and is not entitled to ask for any government largess,
whether it be a job, welfare or a cost plus government contract. This idea of
liberty, however, has been rejected largely in fact and partly in theory for some
time.
It was once true, for example, that a state could discharge its employees
because of their affiliations.182 Now, however, a government employee cannot
be discharged merely because he is a communist. 8 3 In fact, he cannot be
ousted from a government job which he owes to the spoils system after his
political party loses the election.
1 4
Naturally, freedom of speech is the fundamental interest at stake in these
cases. A laissez-faire conception of liberty, however, does not easily require the
state to adapt its power over government jobs to the political beliefs of its work
force. 185 Therefore, liberty which protects state employment from political
reprisal could also give protection against irrational manipulation.
Standardless, unreviewable state action would not be suffered much
longer than the next election if most of the people were frequently exposed to it.
A legislature that voted to make social security benefits or driver's licenses ter-
minable at the will of the bureaucracy probably would be voted into early
retirement in return. The fiefdoms of most bureaucracies, however, include
ing); compare Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 262, 263 (1970); but cf. Monaghan, supra note 168 at 421 n. 112. The
Supreme Court, of course, has rejected this proposition. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S 215, 224 (1976); com-
pare Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal and Correctional Complex, 99 S.Ct. 2100, 2104 (1979).
179 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 13 (1883).
180 Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. at 572.
181 See Monaghan, supra note 174, at 414 n.62.
182 See note 185 infra.
183 Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966).
184 Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
185 In explaining why a policeman could be discharged for political speech, Justice Oliver Wendell
HolmesJr. said in McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517, 517-18 (1892):
The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right
to be a policeman. There are few employments for hire in which the servant does not agree to sus-
pend his constitutional right of free speech, as well as of idleness, by the implied terms of his con-




only a relatively small number of people. It is not easy to see why they should
have to endure something which a majority of the people would never accept
for themselves.
Construing the due process clause to mandate a hearing after the state
commits substantial harm would not be inconsistent with any other uses which
the Supreme Court has had in mind for the clause. In fact, the failure to man-
date such a hearing is anomalous with some of the uses of due process which
the Court seems to have in mind. Exxon, General Motors and large corporate
entities, for example, apparently will be allowed to do business free from
unreasonable restrictions. 186 Like everyone else, of course, they deserve due
process protection. How much they need as a practical matter, however, is
another question. These entities seem able to take care of themselves.
Moreover, they have a lot of natural protection which has nothing to do with
their power of the purse. Any serious unjustified harm inflicted upon them by
government regulation can be immediately passed on to the public. This ability
virtually assures that such a harm will not occur. The power to pass on the cost
of government regulation to the voters and being indispensable to their welfare
are perhaps the best protection against arbitrary government that there is.
With all of their natural protection, corporate giants also have the for-
midable protection, both substantive and procedural, of the due process clause.
On the other hand, a nontenured state employee receives no protection from
an arbitrary discharge by his government. The contrast suggests that due pro-
cess is for the powerful whereas the defenseless are left to their own defenses.
The contrast is disturbing and remains unexplained. Hopefully, it someday
may also become unacceptable.
186 Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 125 (1978); compare New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Or-
rin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 106-07 (1978); Friedman v. Rodgers, 440 U.S. 1, 18 n.19 (1978).
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